
## BCG

Executive Perspectives





## War in Ukraine: Global Update and Perspective on Energy Transition

BCG Global Advantage, Energy and Climate & Sustainability Practice Areas Prepared: 14 June 2022 – Confidential: Limited Distribution

## Introduction to this document


The war continues to be first and foremost a humanitarian crisis, and the top priority for all continues to be the safety and security of people

Moreover, the continuity of the war has resulted in profound economic impact, not only within Ukraine but globally — as supply chains face disruption, commodity prices rise, and unprecedented levels of sanctions take hold We continue to lean into the most pressing issues and questions on the minds of our clients and teams

This edition shares the latest update on the **global economic impact** of the war, as well as its evolving effect on **Energy Transition**. Using the Energy Trilemma as a lens to understand the implications of the crisis, this edition details global transition trends, selected regional/country views, and implications for business leaders and policymakers



War in Ukraine: Global Update and Energy Transition AGENDA




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## **Global economic impact of the war in Ukraine**

Perspective on Energy Transition

- > Global Energy Transition trends
- > Selected region/country views
- > Implications for leaders

## War in Ukraine continues to evolve along several dimensions




Battle intensifies for control of Donbas region. Pres. Zelensky says Russia 'feels too strong' to end war

7.2M refugees from Ukraine; with growing number of countries outside the EU hosting them, e.g., Japan

The World Bank slashed its global growth forecast by nearly a third to 2.9% for 2022

## 7.2M Ukrainians have crossed borders from Ukraine | Capacity constraints in Central Eastern Europe, future flows could add pressure on Western Europe



Note: Actual number of "unique" refugees might be slightly lower as the crossing are not counted as per "unique" person, however at this point it is uncertain whether the return is permanent or temporary. Note: Indicative view; recent analyses indicate that onward travel from directly neighboring countries (particularly Poland, Hungary, Slovakia) and hence also inflow to not directly neighboring countries (particularly Germany, Italy, France) might be higher than stated. Note: These analyses represent only potential scenarios based on discrete data from one point in time. They are not intended as a prediction or forecast, and the situation is changing daily. Source: UNHCR; interviews with NGOS; survey among refugees, Government websites and statistics; BCG calculation & analysis

~53% entered the Schengen Area through Poland and ~13% through Hungary

All other bordering countries also facing capacity constraints

~50% settling down in Central Eastern Europe

~50% already flowing to other countries (including non-EU countries)

Limited flows to rest of the world, with potential to increase long-term intake

An estimated **1.5** - **2M refugees have** returned to Ukraine, mostly from CEE countries; however, uncertainty remains over permanence

## Summary snapshot | War in Ukraine global economic impact

<b>Global Growth Outlook</b>							
GDP Forecasts <sup>1</sup>							
World Bank         Leading FIs           2021         2022         2022							
	Actual	Jan'22 Forecast		08 Jun '22 casts Minimum			
Russia	4.7%	2.4%	-10.0%	-15.3%			
Euro Zone	5.3%	4.2%	2.55%	2.1%			
Global	3.9%	4.1%	3.05%	2.5%			
Note: the World Bank slashed global forecast to 2.9% on 7 June							

#### **Commodity Prices**<sup>4</sup>

dity price (actual \$

Commonly price (actual, $\mathfrak{p}$ )					
Commodity	Jan 3 '22	Jun 7 '22	Change		
Crude Oil (\$/bbl)	79.0	120.6	+53%		
Gas (\$/MWh)	80.4	79.6	-1%		
Coal (\$/t)	157.5	369.0	+134%		
Wheat (€/bu)	274.0	380.3	+39%		
Rapeseed (€/t)	728.5	782.8	+7%		
Nickel (\$/t)	20,430.0	29,395.0	+44%		
Palladium (\$/oz)	1,826.0	1,955.7	+7%		

					Supp	ly Ch	ain N	letrics						
	s Transi	its (Av	osporus g. #/day) <sup>Curr. Wk</sup> (5/30-6/5)	2 ∆CW- PreWar			vg. #/d	<b>Port Ca</b> ay) <sup>2</sup> Curr. Wk (5/30-6/5)	<b>lls</b> ∆CW- PreWar			(Daily A Prev. Wk	y Index Avg) <sup>3</sup> Curr. Wk (5/31-6/6)	∆CW PreW
Northbound Southbound	8.9 9.6	5.6 6.0	5.4 6.0	-39% -63%	Ukraine Russia	4.5 21.6	0.0 21.4	0.0 20.7	-100% -4%	BDI <sup>3</sup>	2780	2913	2586	-79
				Sa	anctio	ns &	Policy	/ Actio	ns					
<ul> <li>US blocks</li> <li>Russia ba Canadian</li> </ul>	ans 963 /	Americ	an citizer	ns, inclu					4,8 Individ		Į,	-73) 508 Ipanies	57 Other e	
			C	orpo	rate A	ction	s in R	ussia	Marke	et				
Based on s	ample o	of +880	companie (~)	€S <sup>6</sup>										
(+1)										(+:	1)		(+28)	
90			390		(+1) 84			(~) — <mark>21</mark> ——			07		192	


1. GDP forecasts from World Bank and FIs per Bloomberg database (8-34 FIs per forecast period) 2. Deep Sea Cargo: oil tankers MR & up, bulkcarriers Panamax & up, containerships 3,000+ TEU, VLGCs, LNG carriers 60,000+ cbm & PCTCs 6,000+ ceu. Clarksons Research (<u>https://www.clarksons.com/</u>) Clarkson Research Services Limited ("Clarksons Research"). © Clarksons Research 2021. All rights in and to Clarksons Research services, information and data ("Information") are reserved to and owned by Clarksons Research. Clarksons Research, its group companies and licensors accept no liability for any errors or omissions in any Information of for any loss or damage howsoever arising. No party may rely on any Information contained in this communication. Please also see the disclaimer at https://www.clarksons.net/Portal/disclaimer, which also applies. No further distribution of any Information is permitted without Clarksons Research's prior written consent. Clarksons Research does not promote, sponsor or endorse the content of this communication. <u>3. https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/BDIY:IND;</u> Baltic Dry Index (BDI) is index of avg price paid for transport of dry bulk mat'ls across 20+ routes 4. S&P Capital IQ 5. Total sanctioned actions, incl. duplications. Source: corrective.org 6. Yale Chief Exec Leadership Inst... Numbers in parenthesis () indicates increase /decrease since last update. Where there is a decrease this is because reclassification due to definitions, and company action recategorization from one to another. Note: BCG does not provide legal or regulatory advice

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Leading Financial Institutions predict major decline in Russia GDP vs. World Bank Jan forecast; World Bank slashed its Global projection to 2.9%

#### GDP Growth (%), Selected Regions, 2021A – 2023F




2021 Actual

World Bank (Jan 2022)

Note: 21 May - 08 June forecast of 31 FIs for Russia, 24 FIs for Eurozone, 8 FIs for Global Sources: World Bank; Bloomberg; BCG Analysis

## **Evolution of key commodity prices**



Source: S&P Capital IQ,7 Jun 22; BCG analysis.

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## Key sanctions and policy actions currently in place

#### **Current sanctions & policy actions (Key examples)**

- Coordinated policy/sanctions programs
  - Limiting SWIFT access, removing "MFN" status, sanctioning gold<sup>1</sup>
  - Enforcing sanctions and export controls via global task force
  - Expelling diplomats, closing embassies/consulates, sanctioning govt officials
  - Limiting or banning energy/coal, key parts, alcohol, luxury goods, steel, etc.
  - Closing EU border crossings and ports, UK prohibits sale of landing rights
- US & UK ban professional services exports, some media outlets
- EU passes "6<sup>th</sup> Round" of sanctions: partial oil import ban, professional services, RU media, further SWIFT restrictions, oligarchs, oil-ship insurance w/ UK agreement
- US blocks Russia payments to US bondholders, bans additional individuals
- Bans "unfriendly" officials, Facebook and Instagram
- Seeks new buyers for oil and gas, demands payment in rubles rather than USD
- Seizes assets and luxury items, declares bankruptcy moratorium
- Threatens to revoke visas of US journalists in retaliation for latest US media sanctions
- Cuts gas supplies to Poland, Bulgaria, Finland, Denmark, and Netherlands
- Bans 963 Americans, including Biden & Harris, and ~20 Canadians from entry

"Western" Allies


Russia

Large EMs

٠

- So far, no sanctions imposed by this group of countries
- China to maintain normal economic and trade relations with RU
- China (& RU) voted against order to halt the invasion at ICI<sup>2</sup> in The Hague
- China & India abstained at 25 Feb UN Security Council vote against invasion
- Indonesia in difficult position, as 2022 G20 host

#### **Current sanction actions by country and target**



#### Sanction targets<sup>5</sup> / $\Delta$ since last update



#### 4. Total sanction actions, includes duplication. 5. Reduction = embassies re-opening

1. Intended to prevent selling gold reserves to finance war; 2. International Court of Justice. 3. ~ 50 embassies in process of re-opening in Kyiv Source: Government websites; Media reports; BCG analysis. Note: BCG does not provide legal or regulatory advice. Source: www.correctiv.org

🚺 New

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## **Recent developments beyond imposed sanctions**

#### "Western" Allies

- EU set to agree candidate status for
   Ukraine, Moldova and potentially Georgia<sup>1</sup>
- Germany's lower house approves €100B special defense fund to modernize its army<sup>2</sup>
- German Chancellor Scholz says Germany is ready to ramp up its military mission in Lithuania in response to Russia's invasion<sup>3</sup>
- President Biden races to expand coalition
   against Russia across Latin American, Asian &
   African countries with limited success to date<sup>4</sup>
- Japan & NATO agree to step up military cooperation & joint exercises as Russia's invasion caused security concerns in Asia<sup>5</sup>
- President Zelensky announces that ~50
   embassies in process of re-opening in Kyiv<sup>6</sup>

#### Russia



- **Russia threatens to push the front line further into Ukraine** as UK and US pledge long-range rockets to help Kyiv<sup>7</sup>
- Russia says two major ports seized by Russia are ready to resume grain shipments<sup>8</sup>
- Russia's parliament votes to remove legal liability for imports by unlicensed distributors of goods and intellectual property<sup>9</sup>
- Russian Airline "Aeroflot" plans to raise up to \$3 billion in an emergency share issue due to Western sanctions and airspace ban<sup>10</sup>
- President Putin signs a decree offering fast track citizenship to Ukrainians in occupied regions<sup>11</sup>

#### Large emerging markets



China warns that USA's Cyber Operations could **lead to an escalation in the war**<sup>12</sup>


**African Union warns EU** that Russia's blockade of Ukraine's ports risks "a catastrophic scenario" of food shortage and price rise<sup>13</sup>

- With war in Ukraine in its third month and Potassium prices tripling in the last year, interest in **mining potassium in the Brazilian** Amazon is being revived<sup>14</sup>
- India's External Affairs Minister claims narrative on India's oil imports from Russia is **unfair**<sup>15</sup>

1. Politico; 2. Financial Times; 3. Reuters; 4. NY Times; 5. AP News; 6. Washington Post 7. Daily Mail; 8. Reuters; 9. Reuters; 10. Reuters; 11. National Post; 12. FMPRC; 13. Guardian; 14. Al-Jazeera; 15. NDTV. Note: BCG does not provide legal or regulatory advice.

## **Overview of corporate actions**

#### **Company Announcements re: Russia Market per Yale School of Management tracking (8 June 2022)**



1. Incl. Banks, Insurance & Investment companies; 2. Incl. IG, Infrastructure, Manufacturing; 3. Inc. Private Equity & Principal Investors, Insurance, Public Sector, and others. 4. Definitions: Exit (Includes Complete / Partial: Cease operations, divestment, discontinue, leave and withdraw business from Russia). Suspend Operations (Includes Complete / Partial: Suspension: Activities, JV, sale points, manufacture in Russia). Halt Shipments/Supply (Temporarily stop / freeze sales and transportation of goods/ services in, to and from Russia). Curtail access to capital (Financial Institutions(FI) restrict, reduce, cut, suspend, Russian access to capital provided by FIs). Suspend New Investments or Partnerships (Stop any new investments in Russia and suspend current sponsorships for Russian Athletes). Source: Yale School of Management; Press search; BCG analysis.

## Selected emerging second- and third-order effects



OPEC has **refused to substantially boost oil output. It only increased supply** by ~648k barrels/day in July & August. This small increase was **not as much as requested by** US, UK and the EU

Russia remains a member, but OPEC delegates recently expressed willingness of some **to explore suspending Russia** from oilproduction deals



Parallel to the Ukraine conflict, long tail of attacks continue in the cyberspace

Microsoft estimated that Russian hackers have carried out **240 attacks on Ukraine's digital resources** since February

'AcidRain' malware on Europe's VIASAT network **disconnected about 3,000 -5,800 wind turbines across Central Europe** 



Energy supply crunch as a result of the conflict is affecting attitudes towards nuclear power


PM Boris Johnson announced the UK's intent to **build 8 new nuclear plants by 2030** to "not be blackmailed by people like Putin"

EU has **approved 'nuclear activities' as part of the EU Green Taxonomy** in green financing, adding to the momentum in nuclear adoption




Ukraine conflict revealed how modern commercial technology could be repurposed to supplement conventional military equipment

- **Space tech:** SpaceX, BlackSky, & others provided satellite internet terminal kits and high-revisit imagery to Ukraine
- **3D Printers**: 3D-printed bombs attached to drones were used as anti-tank grenades



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
Global economic impact of the war in Ukraine

## **Perspective on Energy Transition**


- > Global Energy Transition trends
- > Selected region/country views
- > Implications for leaders

## Summary | Short-term risks but long-term acceleration potential for transition

Global trends	Energy Transition, or the shift from fossil fuels to low-carbon energy sources, faces new challenges; there was a significant emissions reduction gap to 1.5°C path prior to the Ukraine War and the conflict has put the transition timeline at greater risk	
	Transition decisions are shaped by the <b>Energy Trilemma</b> , a set of competing demands/dimensions for decision-makers:	
	Access/affordability   High costs and accessibility challenges trigger policy responses and social unrest	
	Security   Priority in import-dependent regions, esp. Europe, while resource-rich ones (e.g., North America, Middle East) increase expe	orts
	Environment   Near-mid term challenges risk transition ambitions, investments; opportunities for acceleration in long term	
Selected	Europe   Global energy transition leader focused on strengthening energy security, accelerating long-term emissions reduction	
region/ country	US   Key exporter of natural gas in global security efforts; direction on transition policy volatile but innovation, investment strong	
views	Middle East   O&G revenues amid high-price environment provide opportunity to accelerate Greentech and renewables generation	
	China   Focus on affordability & security via coal production could slow short-term transition but commitment is strong in the long ter	rm
	India   Ambiguous energy transition position; steps taken but potential slower transition given fossil fuel use, imports and subsidies	
Implica- tions	Business leaders   Non-energy players should recalibrate their environment agenda to accelerate the long-term transition. Energy players face critical capital allocation decisions to invest fossil fuel cash	
	<b>Policymakers</b> Policymakers face a complex set of Energy & Industrial policy choices with several levers to pull. Long-term decisions made today require balancing Energy Trilemma trade-offs	14



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Global economic impact of the war in Ukraine

## **Perspective on Energy Transition**

> Global Energy Transition trends

- > Selected region/country views
- > Implications for leaders


## Significant emissions reduction gap to 1.5°C path prior to Ukraine conflict

# **120-150% expected gap between current** policies and **1.5°C paths by 2050**

#### 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Current 150 policies 100 Announced pledges (2.1-2.4°C) <2°C Sustainable 50 Development Scenario 1.5°C Net Zero Scenario 0

Global greenhouse gas emissions (% of 1990)

# Below 2°C scenario path projects 2050 coal/oil demand at ~20-50% of today's level



Source: IEA; Climate action Tracker; IEA WEO 2021; BCG analysis.

## Transition decisions shaped by the Energy Trilemma

Trends detailed in next pages

The Ukraine War has reoriented pressures on the **Energy** Trilemma, shifting the balance differently at the regional level depending on resources and constraints

### Energy Access/ Affordability

Access to energy supply to cover demand needs

Cost-competitiveness of energy supplies

Economics of energy production and distribution



### **Energy Security**

Consistent energy supply and stockpiles hedged against geopolitical risks

Ability to pivot in crises and avoid large-scale shortages

### Environment

Emissions reductions, including net zero targets, and other priorities (e.g., particulates, water)

Degree of economy-wide transition ambitions

Access/affordability | High costs and accessibility challenges trigger policy responses and social unrest; RUS trading partners benefit from low prices

## Costs have increased sharply since 2021

Current vs 2021 average price

Natural Gas, TTF

+66% Oil, Brent +125% Coal, API2

+89% Electricity<sup>1</sup>

#### **Policy responses**

Italy

Approved cuts to household electricity rates, price of gasoline

#### Germany

Relief measures passed cutting taxes on petrol and diesel over summer months

#### ≽ South Africa

Fuel subsidy extended to August 2022

\*Examples as of June 1, 2022

### Social unrest

💽 India

Protests disrupted planned liquid petroleum gas (LPG), diesel price hike

Motorists blocked petrol

stations in protest of fuel prices

**Thailand** 

Delivery drivers demanded a gas price cap

# While Russian crude offered at a discount

Discount of Russian Ural crude (relative to price of Brent barrel as base)





Japan, South Korea, China and India buying Russian oil at a discount<sup>4</sup>

1. Average of wholesale electricity prices for select European countries (Germany, Netherlands, France, Poland, Spain, Italy) 2. Estimated cost impact - 12M forecast. 3. Baseline 2021 data for Russia. Note: 2019,2020, 2021 prices average for the year. 4. Nikkei Asia. \*Current price as of June 6th 2022. Source: Bloomberg, EIA; BCG analysis.

# Security | Priority in import-dependent regions, while resource-rich countries increase exports

#### Three observed actions in import-dependent regions



## Strengthen domestic supplies and capacity

- Boost renewables capacity
- Build import-enabling infrastructure (e.g., Natural Gas regasification plants)
- Revamp capacity of existing infrastructure
- Increase domestic supplies (e.g., Natural Gas storage)



#### Revisit dependencies & import strategy

- Review import relations
- Diversify high dependencies with geopolitical allies
- Balance security with affordability of supplies to prevent price increases or volatility



## Leverage demand reduction as hedge

- Adjust demand naturally with higher prices
- Leverage collective action to prevent shortages (e.g., curtailing heating/cooling)
- Introduce incentives for energy efficient infra. (e.g., REPowerEU Heat Pump ambitions)

While **resource-rich countries increase production & exports** to meet supply gaps and capitalize on high global prices

#### **OPEC+** Production vs Quota

Mmbo/d 38 39 39 -40 38 38 38 37 36 34 32 30 Sep-21 Oct-21 Nov-21 Jan-22 Dec-21 Feb-22 Mar-22 Apr-22 Aug-21 Actual production Gap to quota Prepared: 14 June 2022 – Confidential: Limited Distribution

# **Environment** | Near-mid term challenges risk transition ambitions, investments; opportunities for acceleration in long term



#### **ILLUSTRATIVE - NON-EXHAUSTIVE**

#### **NEAR & MEDIUM TERM**



**Policy action** supporting long-term transition **strengthened by security** (e.g., REPowerEU)



LONG TERM

**Revenues in resource-endowed countries** available to **invest in green technologies** 



Integration of **new energy markets & supply chains** could boost transition in **emerging markets** 

Higher interest rates in mid-term could crowd out



Potential price **volatility & shortages** in raw materials could **hinder pace of transition** 

long-term investments in renewables



Uncertainty about pace and size of interest rate tightening could delay investment

High key material costs could hinder short-term

**Short-term cost shock** is significantly increasing the

Diversifying from Russian supply could lead to **short-**

term recourse to emissions-intensive alternatives

Relief measures and recession could **delay transition** 


renewable capacity build-up and delay investment

**support to emerging markets** (e.g., COP \$100B pledge)


economic attractiveness of renewables

Source: BCG analysis and case experience.

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## **Perspective on Energy Transition**


> Global Energy Transition trends

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## Impact of global events post-Feb 2022 assessed in Regional Dashboards

### **Regional/Country Views Dashboards**



#### **Evaluated impact of post-February 2022 global events** on Energy Trilemma dimensions



- **Positive** | Events improved the outlook for the dimension
- **Neutral** | The situation did not change significantly
- **Negative** | Events could hinder the outlook for the dimension

#### Metrics integral to assessing impact on transition

**Demand** | Mid-to long-term energy demand expectations

**Energy mix** | Range of energy sources and respective shares (%)

**Emissions pathway** Climate action performance as assessed by Climate Action Tracker and public commitments set

3 Distilled region- and country-specific takeaways to support decisions

# **Europe** | Global energy transition leader focused on strengthening energy security, accelerating long-term emissions reduction

<b>Impact on Energy Transition</b>	<ul> <li>Positive</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Neutral</li> </ul>	Negative
------------------------------------	------------------------------	-----------------------------	----------

#### Access/affordability

**High & volatile energy prices** limit consumer spending power

Domestic manufacturing **hindered** by high hydrocarbon prices

Long-term investment outlook in renewables encouraging as economics are increasingly attractive

#### Security

**Emergency** use of **coal** & fossil fuel **subsidies** to prevent social unrest

REPowerEU plan devised to rapidly reduce Russian fossil fuels dependence and accelerate transition

> Short-term transition success at risk due to **shortage of key materials**

#### Environment

Securing **non-Russian energy** from trade partners of choice (e.g., US, Canada, North Africa), especially LNG


**Leadership in renewables** is core to energy security, fostering intra-EU investment in renewables and the creation of new markets

#### Demand



Energy demand **flat** since pre-Eurozone crisis peak

#### **Energy mix<sup>1</sup>**



#### **Emissions pathway**

Climate Action Tracker Rating: Insufficient



#### Key takeaways

sector

Energy

Economy-wide

Short-term impact of war mitigated as **energy transition scales up**, attracting companies with aggressive net zero plans

**Investment flows** to renewables and energy efficiency measures

**Challenge to economic competitiveness** in near-term due to high and volatile energy and commodity prices

Risk of **social unrest** towards high energy prices looms, potentially challenging short-term acceleration of energy transition

1. Based on IEA WEO 2021 primary energy demand of Stated Policies scenario. Source: IEA; Climate Action Tracker; BCG analysis and case experience.

# **US** | Key exporter of natural gas in global security efforts; direction on transition policy volatile but innovation, investment strong

**Impact on Energy Transition** • *Positive* • *Neutral* • *Negative* 

#### Access/affordability

High prices reduce household **spending power**; mounting pressure for **fuel subsidies** & gas tax relief

US O&G companies leverage high prices & accommodating policy environment to boost production and fast-track LNG capacity

#### Security

Limited reliance on Russian energy and domestic resources result in **strong security of fossil fuel-based energy supply** 

> Loosening of some minor sanctions against Iran & Venezuela signals slow and cautious **reevaluation of trading partners**

#### Environment

Climate policy uncertain, volatile due to political differences

**Reducing methane emissions** in O&G production is a priority due to economic & climate benefits


Environmental **momentum at risk** due to negative public sentiment given high prices & inflation

## Demand



**Slowing** demand due to demographics and potential recession

#### Energy mix<sup>1</sup>



#### **Emissions pathway**

Climate Action Tracker Rating: Insufficient

**50-52%** 2030 emissions reduction target vs 2005

#### Key takeaways

Energy sector

Economy-wide

**Natural gas** benefits from short- to mid-term price advantage as drilling ramps up

US to expand **hydrocarbon export capacity** in bid to support allies' energy security

**US climate policy volatile** and subject to partisanship with differences among states

Market forces to drive transition as focus on innovation through government investment and market signals strengthens

1. Based on IEA WEO 2021 primary energy demand of Stated Policies scenario. Source: IEA; Climate Action Tracker; BCG analysis and case experience.

## Middle East | O&G revenues amid high-price environment provide opportunity to accelerate Greentech and renewables generation

Impact on Energy Transition	● Positive ● Neutral ● Negative	Demand	Key takeaways		
Access/affordability Energy prices remain affordable due to strong domestic low-cost production	Security Strong security position due to abundance of hydrocarbon resources complemented by the development of	Slowing demand due to demographics and higher efficiency Energy mix <sup>1</sup>	Natural gas and oil benefit from price advantage as the region will remain a hydrocarbon export leader		
Re-shoring to the region can attract <b>energy</b> - <b>intensive companies</b> seeking cost avoidance	renewable capacity and hubs (e.g., in green hydrogen)	1% Nuclear 59% Natural gas 1% 1%	<b>Key role supporting price</b> <b>stability</b> in global oil & gas markets through increased production		
Environment		Coal 38% Oil Emissions pathway	<b>Revenue available to invest in</b> <b>Greentech innovation</b> , domestic capacity and the creation of hubs		
The region remains a fossil-fuel powerh	ouse and leading exporter	Climate Action Tracker Rating:	-wide		

Hydrocarbon revenues available to boost to low-carbon **technologies investment** (e.g., green hydrogen, solar)

**Critically Insufficient** 

2030 emissions 0-24% reduction target vs "business as usual" Economy-v

**Renewables** can become a source of foreign investment and economic diversification

## China | Focus on affordability & security via coal production could slow short-term transition but commitment is strong in the long term

**Impact on Energy Transition** • *Positive* • *Neutral* • *Negative* 

#### Access/affordability

The government enacted **policies** (e.g., subsidies) to mitigate impact of rising prices on households

Potential for reduced **demand** for Chinese goods due to higher production costs

#### **Security**

Security is a priority, boosting production across all energy sources (e.g., coal production, renewables)

> Seeking less reliance on fossil fuels (e.g., push for more EVs)

> > Tighter control of **energy** export volumes to ensure sufficient domestic supply

#### Environment

The recent pivot to **coal production** could offset short-term emissions reduction efforts


China is committed to emissions reduction even if **lower priority** than smog, particulate pollution, or GDP growth

#### Demand



Growing demand on the back of slowerbut-sustained economic growth

#### Energy mix<sup>1</sup>



#### **Emissions pathway**

Climate Action Tracker Rating: **Highly Insufficient** 

2030 reduction in >65% carbon intensity vs 2005

Economy-wide

Energy sector

Short-term pivot in domestic coal production as energy security is paired with longer term climate ambitions

**Key takeaways** 

Continued effort to build capability to supply/export needed materials and advanced **Greentech** for global renewable energy scale-up

Amid near-term price pressures and other environmental priorities, China committed to emissions reduction

1. Based on IEA WEO 2021 primary energy demand of Stated Policies scenario. Source: IEA; Climate Action Tracker; BCG analysis and case experience.

## **India** Ambiguous energy transition position; steps taken but potentially slower transition given fossil fuel use, imports, and subsidies

**Impact on Energy Transition** • *Positive* • *Neutral* • *Negative* 

#### Access/affordability

High prices reduce household **spending power;** pressure for subsidies but not widely implemented yet

Fuel access prioritized for energy industries, putting broad-based economic growth at short-term risk

#### **Security**

Low reliance on Russian **energy;** despite imports increase, Russian oil still a small share of energy mix

#### Environment

Energy transition to slow due to increase coal use to minimize import dependence; stalled COP \$100B funding could affect all emerging markets


Large-scale renewables plan in motion; impetus could focus on upstream Greentech segments to **secure supplies** (e.g., batteries, solar PV cells, etc.)

#### Demand





#### Energy mix<sup>1</sup>



#### **Emissions pathway**

Climate Action Tracker Rating: **Highly Insufficient** 2030 reduction in 33-35% carbon intensity vs 2005

Economy-wide

Short-term boost in coal production for domestic, nonindustrial use as energy affordability is top concern

**Key takeaways** 

sector


Energy

Slower transition given coal and fossil-fuel intensive rural economy and expected economic growth


Demand for greater subsidies could **limit** government's ability to invest in upstream Greentech segments & alternative fuels (e.g., green hydrogen, biofuels)

**Social concern** as air quality, other environmental issues worsen

1. Based on IEA WEO 2021 primary energy demand of Stated Policies scenario. Source: IEA Climate Action Tracker; BCG analysis and case experience.



War in Ukraine: Global Update and Energy Transition AGENDA



Prepared: 14 June 2022 - Confidential: Limited Distribution

Global economic impact of the war in Ukraine

## **Perspective on Energy Transition**

> Global Energy Transition trends

> Selected region/country views

> Implications for leaders

Prepared: 14 June 2022 – Confidential: Limited Distribution

## Overall, eight key trends impact the Energy Transition outlook

#### **ILLUSTRATIVE - NON-EXHAUSTIVE**



**Supply shocks** are not easy to recover from energy **prices** remain difficult to manage, **volatile** for years



Sustained high prices spread 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> order effects across industrial and transport sectors, exacerbating **inflationary pressures** 



Governments enact **near term protective energy policies** that affect **investment and pace of the transition long term** 



**Energy access in the developing world** continues to be an important **issue**, building upon negative Covid impact



Companies and governments assess **expanding hydrocarbon capacity** as a hedge against **volatility**, with potential decades-long impact



Companies face **capital allocation** decisions in an environment of **high interest rates and increased fiscal and regulatory uncertainty** 



Supply chains remain constrained,

impacting availability & cost of clean energy materials



**Security concerns** on origins & sourcing of **rare earths & metals** (e.g., cobalt, lithium, nickel) gain relevance as central to the transition

## Energy Transition priorities emerge for players across sectors

leaders for business Implications



• Proactively & responsibly allocate capital to transition business toward low-carbon output

Invest in **renewables-focused** capabilities, knowledge development, and new markets entry (e.g., through partnership-building)

Build supply chain resilience / localization for key energy transition materials

 $\checkmark$ 

# Policymakers also face a complex set of Energy & Industrial policy choices with several levers to pull

Provide targeted financial relief to low-income households; direct-to-pocket transfers best suited to limit further stimulating demand for fuel

policy



**Encourage continued investment** in clean energy infrastructure (e.g., tax incentives), remaining committed to net zero targets and transparent about progress

Consider demand-side measures to curtail emissions impact and maximize efficiency



 $\checkmark$ 

 $\checkmark$ 

Press on with plans for needed **energy policy reform including carbon pricing, roll out gradually** as short-term price pressures on businesses, households subside

Industrial policy

Implications for policy leaders

Energy



Design investment incentives (e.g., fiscal benefits, special zones, etc.) to push the transition across the industrial base, foster green production/tech, and decarbonize (e.g., carbon pricing)



Invest in a **clean energy workforce**, including **upskilling** current workers, cultivating **local** talent, and **attracting foreign-trained** workers with experience in energy transition



Build **cross-border partnerships** between developed and less developed countries to facilitate transfer of energy transition know-how



Support **relocation of production and trade agreements** to strengthen **supply chain resilience** in sourcing key components & materials

Complex policy choices made today require balancing Energy Trilemma trade-offs ILLUSTRATIVE – SELECTED EXAMPLES

#### **Potential execution complexities** Measures Impact **Discretionary** tax cuts to lower prices at pump, **Fuel price &** irrespective of household income differences tax cuts High-income consumer demand incentivized to protect consumers Environment impacted as **emissions** increase **Emergency pivot to coal** as alternative to exposed **Recourse** cleaner supplies (e.g., Russian natural gas) to coal to Coal plant life extension creates further prevent committed emissions geopolitical exposure May **reduce short-term investment** in renewables Scale-up in renewable capacity requires **minerals and Renewables** key components sourced from new trade partners scale-up with potentially Higher demand and supply chain bottlenecks drive price and supply volatility insecure supply chains • Risks in mineral supplies **could hinder access** Security Impact of policy execution on Trilemma dimension • Positive • Neutral • Negative Affordabilit

Environment

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